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Abstract
Asbestos is a fiberlike insulation material that causes cancer and respiratory diseases, namely mesothelioma
and asbestosis (Times, 1994). The victims of asbestos, which include people of all occupations, fiom asbestos-
textile workers to secretaries at public schools, have no hope for a cure for their illness which causes extreme
pain and possibly death for its victims. It has been estimated that some 200,000 asbestos-related claims have
been resolved thus far, with 200,000 more still pending and 50 to 60 new claims being filed each day (Snyder,
1994). This paper will explore asbestos issues by looking at the history of the asbestos problem, recent events
in the industry, and how the problem is changing.
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Killed by Asbestos 
Matt Mikulcik 
"Tragically, nothing can be done. There is no cure for either mesothelioma or asbestosis, a 
thickening of the fiber of the lungs. 7he victims usually feel no ill efjects until they suddenlyfind 
themselves short of breath. The worst afjected waste away and eventually die in an agonizing, 
choking ~pamt " ~onom i s t ,  1995). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Asbestos is a fiberlike insulation material 
that causes cancer and respiratory diseases, 
namely mesothelioma and asbestosis (Times, 
1994). The victims of asbestos, which include 
people of all occupations, fiom asbestos-textile 
workers to secretaries at public schools, have 
no hope for a cure for their illness which 
causes extreme pain and possibly death for its 
victims. It has been estimated that some 
200,000 asbestos-related claims have been 
resolved thus far, with 200,000 more still 
pending and 50 to 60 new claims being filed 
each day (Snyder, 1994). This paper will 
explore asbestos issues by looking at the 
history of the asbestos problem, recent events 
in the industry, and how the problem is 
changing. 
IL HISTORY 
While attention to the dangers of asbestos 
has only occurred relatively recently, asbestos 
has been around for a long time. The first time 
that adverse ~ e c t s  as a result of asbestos 
were noticed and recorded was in the fist 
century. The Greek geographer Strabo and 
the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder both 
noticed a "sickness of the lungs in slaves 
whose task it was to weave asbestos into 
cloth" (Brodeur, 1985). They were not 
concerned with the possibility that asbestos 
might be a health hazard but were instead 
enthralled by its "magical properties" that its 
delicate fibers "not only can withstand the 
fiercest heat but are so soft and flexible that 
they can be spun and woven as easily as fibers 
of cotton" (Brodeur, 1985). It was these 
amazing properties that brought asbestos into 
the modem world. During the industrial 
revolution, the properties of asbestos led it to 
be used extensively as an insulator. The fact 
that it might be dangerous had been long 
forgotten. 
Information on the dangers of asbestos 
resurficed in 1900. Dr. H. Montague Murray, 
a physician in London's Charing Cross 
Hospital, was able to establish a presumptive 
connection between asbestos and sever 
pulmonary fibrosis, a respiratory disease. He 
had performed a post-mortem examination on 
a worker who had dealt with asbestos for 
fourteen years and had found the cause of his 
death to be linked to asbestos (Brodeur, 
1985). In 1924, the first clear case of death 
due to asbestos was established by Dr. W. E. 
Cooke. Between 1928 and 1929 an 
investigation of asbestos-textile workers was 
conducted by Dr. E. R.A. Merewether that 
found that the incidence of fibrosis increased in 
direct proportion to the number of years 
worked to the point where 81% of those 
employed twenty or more years had it 
(Brodeur, 1985). 
None of these findings or others like them 
did anything to interrupt the flow of business 
in the asbestos industry. It wasn't until 1961, 
nearly two thousand years after the possible 
negative effects of asbestos had been first 
noticed, that the first case was bought against 
the asbestos industry. Claude J. Tomplait, 
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who had worked in the asbestos industry about 
twenty-five years, brought a claim against his 
employers Annstrong Contracting & Supply 
Corporation, Industrial Insulators, the Johns- 
Manville Corporation, and the Aber Company, 
and thereby brought a claim against their 
insurers the Travelers Insurance Company, the 
Texas Employers' Insurance Association, and 
the Queen Insurance Company of America 
(Brodeur, 1985). He was filing for workers 
compensation for the illness he developed due 
to asbestos, but his claim was denied on the 
basis that he failed to establish his illness 
developed on the job. He then filed a lawsuit 
for disability and asked for the maximum 
amount of $14,035. He ended up settling out 
of court with the insurance companies for a 
total of $7,500, a very small amount for his 
disability. He then proceeded to sue the 
m a n u f ~ e r s  of the asbestos insulation which 
he had worked with. 
"Since no one knew for sure 
how great the exposure to 
asbestos was, no one knew 
what the damages would be." 
To win he needed to show that the 
man-ers, mainly Fibreboard, should have 
foreseen the dangers and warned the users of 
their products (Brodeur, 1985). To support 
his case, Tomplait had a testimony from Dr. 
Selikoff that during the span of time that 
Tomplait worked "literally hundreds of studies 
on the relation between asbestos-dust 
exposure and the occurrence of asbestosis 
were published by independent academic and 
scientific investigatorsy' (Brodeur, 1985). 
These studies should have alerted the 
manufacturers of the dangers associated with 
asbestos, and they therefore should have 
warned the users of asbestos. His case fell 
through, however, when he could not 
remember precisely on what jobs he had used 
Fibreboard products. The same strategy 
worked in the case Borel v. Fibreboard which 
immediately followed the Tomplait case. The 
case argued successfblly that Fibreboard 
products were unreasonably dangerous 
"because they did not carry adequate warnings 
of the foreseeable dangers associated with 
them" (Brodeur, 1985). The Borel case set 
the precedent for many, many cases that were 
to follow as Fibreboard, and therefore its 
insurer, had been found liable for the asbestos 
claim. 
IIL RECENTLY 
After the success of the Borel case, people 
who had been sickened by asbestos started to 
come forward. Case after case came, and in 
almost all instances the injured person won. 
The enonnous number of these cases that 
might still come in is not known, but Dr. 
Selikoff has estimated "that among the twenty- 
one million living American men and women 
who had been occupationally exposed to 
asbestos between 1940 and 1980 there would 
be between eight and ten thousand deaths fiom 
asbestos-related cancer for each of the next 
twenty years" (Brodeur, 1985). This is a huge 
amount of potential liability, and that does not 
even include those who are injured by asbestos 
but do not die. Paul Brodeur writes that in the 
1980's "it was recognized in financial circles 
that asbestos litigation was going to cause a 
hemorrhage of serious, if not catastrophic, 
proportions in the assets of asbestos-insulation 
manufacturers and their insurers" (Brodeur, 
1985) and the main reason for this was 
uncertainty. It was going to be hard for the 
insurers to set aside reserves if they did not 
know what kind of losses to expect. Since no 
one knew for sure how great the exposure to 
asbestos was, no one knew what the damages 
would be. 
With this possibility for huge losses comes 
the desire not to be the one who has to pay the 
claims. The manufhchrers have been trying to 
pass the bill on to the insurers, the insurers are 
trying to avoid getting it, and if they do get it, 
the insurers are trying to get other insurers to 
pay for it. 
Most of the manufacturers of asbestos 
insulation had bought insurance to protect 
them from any potential lawsuits that might 
occur. As the lawsuits come in, the 
manufacturers are trying to collect on their 
policy. They claim that they bought the 
insurance so that it would cover problems such 
as these, and so they want to collect. For 
example, Fibreboard, in attempt to protect the 
company, "bought two no-limit insurance 
policies that could save the company" (Forbes, 
1993) in light of all the cases brought against 
it. 
The insurance companies are fighting these 
claims. The insurance companies are trying to 
argue that there was no way they could have 
had knowledge about the potential dangers of 
asbestos, and that when selling the policies, 
manukturers withheld information about the 
dangers. As a result, they claim that the 
policies are fraudulent and therefore the 
manufacturers are responsible to pay the 
claims. Sometimes this argument works. For 
example, an appellate court has ruled that 
insurers of Owens-Illinois Inc. (0-1) "may 
have cause to argue that they were 
fraudulently misled by the company over its 
potential future asbestos liability" (Otis, 1993). 
The courts ruled that 0-1's losses were 
expected and intended due to prior knowledge 
of the dangers of asbestos, and therefore the 
insurers are not liable. This is the exception 
though, not the rule. In most cases, the court 
has ruled against the insurers. In one extreme 
case dealing with Commercial Union 
insurance, Judge Giles is reported to have said 
"[wlhat is it that Commercial Union could not 
have discovered using its own research with 
respect to asbestos? What research could it 
not have done? What intelligence did it not 
have?" (Brodeur, 1985). While allegations 
such as these may seem rather harsh, generally 
they are relevant. Many insurers have known 
for a long time the dangers of asbestos, and 
Brodeur points out that discovering it was "a 
simple matter of studying their actuarial tables 
and discovering that the [asbestos] workers 
were experiencing premature deaths" 
(Brodeur, 1985). The insurance companies by 
and large knew of the dangers when they 
wrote their policies, which is why their claim 
of ignorance tends to fail. They had made the 
decision to collect the premiums from the 
asbestos insurance, invest, make a nice profit, 
and have money left to pay the claims when 
they came in. This strategy was working for 
years, but after the Bore1 case, expenses got to 
be too much as the claims started piling up. 
As a result, the insurers have made their best 
effort to get out of the market but have 
generally failed. 
Eventually realizing that they were going 
to have to pay the claims, insurers changed 
from pointing the finger at the manufactwen 
to pointing the fhger at other insurers. The 
insurers came up with two different theories in 
the 1980's on how to determine who should 
pay - the exposure theory and the 
manifestation theory. The exposure theory 
holds that "all insurers providing coverage to 
the asbestos manufacturer during the period 
the injured person was exposed to the asbestos 
should share the cost of indemnifjing and 
defending the policyholder" (Snyder, 1994). 
This also meant that the manufacturer would 
have to contribute if there were periods that 
the manufacturer was self-insured. On the 
other hand, the d e s t a t i o n  theory holds that 
"the insurer covering the manufacturer when 
the disease became clinically evident must 
indemnifj, and defend the policyholder" 
(Snyder, 1994). This also meant that as there 
was no coverage at the time of manifestation, 
the manufacturer would have to pay the 
required compensation. 
Which theory a particular company was in 
favor of depended on how their asbestos 
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insurance was written. If the company had 
written a lot of coverage in the latter part of 
the century, they were likely to be in favor of 
the exposure theory. The exposure theory 
spreads out the burden more, and a late 
entering company was not likely to get burned. 
If they had Mitten most of their coverage in 
the early part of the century, the company was 
likely to be in favor of the manifestation 
theory. They were hoping that the late 
least another 200,000 expected (Wojcik, 
1993). These lawsuits are being filed by 
people who did not work directly with 
asbestos, but rather were exposed to it as an 
unknowing side effect of the job they chose. 
These people can include anyone fiom a 
secretary exposed through fibers filtering 
through the air ducts to maintenance workers 
exposed to asbestos insulation around leaky 
water pipes (Wojcik, 1993). 
comP&es would have to pay the buk 
of the claims. The courts initially favored the 
exposure theory, but then they switched to a 
new theory. This new theory, the triple-trigger 
theory, holds that "all of the  manufacture?^ 
insurers during the periods of exposure to 
asbestos, the subsequent periods of the 
development of the disease and the 
manifestation of it should provide coverage" 
(Snyder, 1994). The courts realized that 
asbestos was a disease that took time to 
develop, and therefore felt it was unfair to 
place the burden of compensation on a single 
insurer. They felt that the responsibility to 
cover should be spread out, initially spreading 
it out to earlier insurers and then recently 
expanding it to include all the insurers 
involved. 
IV. CHANGES 
There are three noteworthy changes that 
are occurring in the asbestos industry. The 
first change comes in the composition of the 
bodily injury claimants. Asbestos claims have 
traditionally come fiom people who have 
worked with asbestos, but "while the first 
torrents of asbestos bodily injury claims have 
come fiom workers in shipyards and 
construction sites who were directly exposed 
to the deadly substance, this . . . wave could 
entail claims fiom just about anyone" (Wojcik, 
1993). The type of people claiming damages 
is changing. There have been more than 
250,000 lawsuits filed by people that have 
been "exposed" to asbestos and there are at 
"There have been more than 
250,000 lawsuits filed by 
people that have been 
'exposed' to asbestos and 
there are at least another 
200.000 expected." 
The second change is fiom a focus on 
bodily injury to a focus on property. On 
November 7, 1994, an Illinois appellate court 
ruled that insurers of United States Gypsum 
Company were liable for $600 million in 
asbestos property claims (Times, 1994). 
Claims had been brought against United States 
Gypsum for asbestos removal and damages, 
and the courts ruled that the insurers would 
have to pay. The court ruled that "dl policies 
in effect fiom the date of installation to the 
date of removal of asbestos-containing 
products provide coverage" (Times, 1993), in 
effect following the triple-trigger theory that 
was applied to bodily injury claims. This is a 
significant blow to insurers since according to 
Garry Chandler there seems to be a "shifting to 
claims regarding property damage and 
asbestos abatement.. .where asbestos removal 
involves possible business interruption and 
financial loss" (Chandler, 1992). The reason 
this is significant is that asbestos is a common 
material found in many buildings. It is used in 
many building materials such as acoustical 
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ceiIiing treatment, "popcorn" ceilings, thermal The advantages to controlling the asbestos 
insulation, plaster, drywall, floor tile, ceiling rather than immediately removing it are two- 
tile. and 3.600 other building materials fold-- 1)it allows time to budget for the 
(Gudet, 1995). With asbestos so common, 
and the concern about health effects so strong, 
a lot of abatement has occurred and will 
continue to occur. Wtth this abatement comes 
significant costs which includes both the 
expense of getting the work done and the 
possible loss of resources. If a commercial 
building has to be closed for a period of time 
so the asbestos can be removed, this will be 
expensive in terms of cost of loss of use. To 
recover these losses, companies are turning to 
the asbestos companies and manufacturers, 
which are now turning to the insurers. With 
the prevalence of asbestos, the insurers are 
going to have to change their concern fiom 
just bodily injury to include property as well in 
order to prepare for the hture wave of claims. 
The third change is occurring in the way 
people are dealing with asbestos. Companies 
that have an asbestos problem in their 
buildings are starting to look to means other 
than property insurance to deal with their risk. 
They are changing to an asbestos control 
approach. Asbestos removal is expensive and 
Joseph Gaudet writes that "the mere existence 
of asbestos does not mean occupants of the 
building are in danger" (Gaudet, 1995). If 
handled correctly and if the asbestos- 
containing materials are kept in good 
condition, he feels that "asbestos is a 
manageable hazard." This is a very delicate 
situation, however, and must be dealt with 
extreme caution. Gaudet recommends 
following an operations and maintenance 
(O&M) program which should include 
"employee awareness training, periodic 
inspection protocols, extensive record- 
keeping, personnel and air monitoring, 
maintenance techniques, emergency response 
and emergency contact" (Gaudet, 1995). The 
risk managers have to be very carefbl and 
make sure that everything is handled correctly 
to maintain safety and to minimize exposure. 
removal and 2)"even the EPA h& taken the 
posture that managing asbestos in place can 
sometimes be better than removing it" 
(Wojcik, 1993). By removing the asbestos, 
the particles have the potential to get shaken 
loose and to start circulating in the air. By 
controlling it, the company has more time to 
plan an efficient and effective way to remove 
the asbestos. John Dietrichs is quick to point 
out that while an O&M program "allows 
building owners to put off abatement until a 
later date" it is important to keep in mind "that 
while O&M is an inexpensive alternative 
compared to total abatement, it is only a 
temporary one" (Chain, 1993). The O&M 
program is just a means to an end, since 
eventually all the asbestos will have to be 
removed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Asbestos is a material that has ruined many 
lives, yet if any of the major insurers of the 
asbestos industry "had gone public with their 
inside knowledge, they might have been able 
to save tens of thousands of lives and untold 
suffering and pain" (Brodeur, 1985). The 
insurers knew of the dangers of asbestos, as 
did the manufacturers at a later date, yet none 
of them felt inclined to release this information 
to the public. To have done so would have 
undoubtedly resulted in a huge rush of claims 
as people experiencing adverse affects fiom 
asbestos came forth. The insurers decided to 
take a risk and try to keep things quite, and 
now they are regretting their decision as the 
number of claims filed is well beyond what it 
would have been earlier. With the hundreds of 
thousands of liability claims already in, the 
thousands more still coming in, and the 
property claims starting to reach respectable 
levels, the companies that wrote insurance for 
asbestos liability are not in a good position. 
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Risk Associated With Different College Majors 
L INTRODUCTION 
Dan Scholz 
There have been numerous studies to show 
that students in engineering, and scientifically 
oriented fields typically have higher average 
earnings than students in broader studies l i e  
the humanities and English (Altonji, 1993; 
Angle and Wissrnann, 1981; Berger, 1988 
"cohort"; Reed and Miller, 1970). The 
question arises as to why there is a diierence. 
While there are probably many different 
factors for the wage differentials, risk must be 
considered one of those factors. If diierent 
risks are associated with different majors, it 
would certainly be feasible that wage 
differentials would arise. 
What leads to different magnitudes of risk? 
Presumably the job-spdc training inherent in 
the field of study would play a large role in 
determining the amount of risk. Gary Becker 
has touched on this issue when analyzing the 
returns to job specific training and general 
training within a firm. Becker defined general 
training as "being usefbl to many firms besides 
those providing it" (Becker, 1975, p.19), 
whereas job-specific training is only useful to 
one firm. This logic can be extended a step 
hrther to include types of education. Liberal 
arts-type educations should provide the 
equivalent of general training which can be 
applied to many different fields, while 
technical-type educations should be usefbl to 
only a few fields in the same manner as job- 
specific training. If a technically educated 
individual desires to try histher hand at another 
field, or is forced to for the lack of job 
opportunity within hidher own field, it is likely 
that they will not be as apt as others with 
broader, more malleable educations. Hence 
they will suffer "risk" from specific training. 
In Becker's analysis, he finds that general 
training will not result in increased wages paid 
by the employer, but job-specific training will. 
This is because the general training can be 
utilized by other firms, while the specific 
training cannot. With similar logic it can be 
hypothesized that those in technical fields 
should earn a higher wage on average, while 
those with liberal arts educations should earn 
less on average. Because of the limited 
application of technical fields, they are 
presumed to have more risk. The presence 
and magnitude of this risk is to be studied 
here. Does this risk really exist, and if so what 
fields are considered the least and most risky? 
It would be of great interest to determine 
the relative riskiness of different majors. If 
there is a significant difference in risk, risk can 
be considered an important determinant of 
wages in certain fields of study. From this, 
students and others will be able to make more 
informed decisions when it comes to 
evaluating different career choices. If it is 
determined that there is no significant risk 
associated with higher average wages, then 
alternative explanations for wage differentials 
can be pursued. 
IL DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND 
RELATED WORK 
It has been established in the literature that 
investment in education will yield a higher 
return in terms of average earnings. This is 
consistent with human capital theory 
developed largely by Becker, which says that 
increasing one's ability, or human capital, 
increases one's productivity and thus a higher 
return on this capital may be demanded by the 
individual (Ehrenberg and Smith 1991). In 
fact this has been the case in many recent 
studies. Joseph G. Altonji (1993) finds that 
